La presentazione del piano di salvataggio per il settore bancario statunitense, che mezzo mondo attendeva con il fiato sospeso per oggi, è stata prontamente rimandata di un giorno da Timoty Geithner . Secondo l'attuale ministro del tesoro USA, l'attenzione dell'amministrazione Obama sarebbe completamente assorbita dall'approvazione del pacchetto di stimolo all'economia, tanto da non lasciare ad essa, alcuno spazio per occuparsi di altro.
Quel poco che è trapelato la scorsa settimana sulle ipotesi di intervento, sembra configurare però, un ridimensionamento rispetto a quanto annunciato dallo stesso ministro negli ultimi tempi. L'approccio di tipo " bad bank " verrebbe messo da parte o adottato solo in misura limitata. Ad esso sarebbe preferita un' estensione delle garanzie governative, che investa tutti gli assets tossici in possesso delle banche, sulla falsa riga delle misure adottate nei confronti di Citigroup e di Bank of America.
Per quel che riguarda il settore bancario conviene quindi aspettare un giorno prima di commentare, per non correre il rischio di discutere del nulla. Sul prossimo pacchetto di stimulus contrast, we know enough details that you can already draw some conclusions.
The Washington Post has enjoyed draw a few diagrams from headaches how the 819 billion dollars in aid will be allocated to the economy. The thing that immediately leaps to the eyes is the extreme fragmentation of the interventions. A fact that has reopened the debate over how much a certain type of public spending actually contributes to help the economy. The New York Times in an interesting article Martin Fackler reviews the Japanese experience of 90 years.
An argument often treated on this blog. The Japanese begin to
dal 1991, per sfuggire alla deflazione (e a un eventuale depressione), causata dalla scoppio della bolla immobiliare di fine anni 80, arrivarono a spendere in opere pubbliche (al settembre dello scorso anno), la strabiliante somma di 6,3 trilioni di dollari portando il rapporto debito/ pil del paese al 180% (il secondo al mondo dopo quello libanese se non ricordo male). L'effetto di questi interventi sull'economia del paese orientale fu limitato e non salvò il Giappone da quasi 15 anni di stagnazione economica. L'esperienza giapponese ha prodotto due scuole di pensiero: chi ritiene, come Geithner , che il Giappone non sia intervenuto in maniera sufficientemente massiccia e tempestiva, diluting public expenditure over a lengthy period and those who believe that this kind of involvement is simply useless.
The bottom part of NYT seems to be: "if you really need to intervene with public money, let's at least in those areas that can ensure a continuous level of development and employment in the near future."
In this sense, build cathedrals in the desert that appears questionable practical utility, and that once fully discharged any impact on the employment side, it would be a great strategy. The money should be invested in innovative sectors can create jobs and future development. Which brings us back to the old talk about what a state whose action is often based on political considerations, is able to correctly identify the areas in question.
Obama and the package of action drawn up by his administration do not even pretend to identify areas preferred. The money seems to be spread in the hope that rain would come magically to create a lasting and sustainable development. It is also an amount of money sufficient to satisfy the most ardent interventionists. Paul Krugman , always from the pages of the NYT , launches an urgent warning: the magnitude of the stimulus package would be too limited. According Krugman should be at least 50% higher in order to achieve any significant effect. The noted economist also accused the U.S. Senate have imposed unreasonable limits on aid granted to individual states in the name of a centrist logic, thus leaving open one of the most sensitive nerves of the U.S. economy.
All according Krugman would result in at least 600,000 more unemployed over the next two years.
That deficit of individual states is a really good tough nuts to crack, but I think Krugman on this side can calm down. Even if the U.S. government will not intervene now, it will be obliged to do so tomorrow. The alternative would be to accept the failure of an unknown number of states, a way not feasible politically.
Another character that would classify as interventionist Nuriel Roubini, lately seems to distance itself from the maneuvers of the American administration and recalling the Japanese example says
Roubini puts it, acutely, the nail on the head. If you do not clearly resolve the problem of insolvency and banking of excess private debt, any other type of intervention in danger of being vain. Moreover, even if they wanted to bet on state investment, the 819 billion measures decided by the team of Obama because they are too few can obtain a significant result and are scattered in many streams throughout the entire spectrum of the economy. It is difficult to translate into steady growth and self development.
Those who hoped that the coming of Obama would represent a radical change had to change his mind. After establishing the composition of his economic team all hope has faded gradually. The block does not make decisions on matters economic - consisting Geithner, Rubin, Summers etc. - belongs to the tip of the hair to a estabilishment composed of bankers and lobbyists, while the few old-school counselors who could advance at Obama's policies more reasonable and less prone to the will of Wall Street as Paul Volcker were marginalized.
Tomorrow we will know who wants to Geithner, but as I expected in the past, it will be difficult for something really positive or decisive. Regarding economic issues I do not think that U.S. citizens can be said to be in good hands.
Quel poco che è trapelato la scorsa settimana sulle ipotesi di intervento, sembra configurare però, un ridimensionamento rispetto a quanto annunciato dallo stesso ministro negli ultimi tempi. L'approccio di tipo " bad bank " verrebbe messo da parte o adottato solo in misura limitata. Ad esso sarebbe preferita un' estensione delle garanzie governative, che investa tutti gli assets tossici in possesso delle banche, sulla falsa riga delle misure adottate nei confronti di Citigroup e di Bank of America.
Per quel che riguarda il settore bancario conviene quindi aspettare un giorno prima di commentare, per non correre il rischio di discutere del nulla. Sul prossimo pacchetto di stimulus contrast, we know enough details that you can already draw some conclusions.
The Washington Post has enjoyed draw a few diagrams from headaches how the 819 billion dollars in aid will be allocated to the economy. The thing that immediately leaps to the eyes is the extreme fragmentation of the interventions. A fact that has reopened the debate over how much a certain type of public spending actually contributes to help the economy. The New York Times in an interesting article Martin Fackler reviews the Japanese experience of 90 years.
An argument often treated on this blog. The Japanese begin to
dal 1991, per sfuggire alla deflazione (e a un eventuale depressione), causata dalla scoppio della bolla immobiliare di fine anni 80, arrivarono a spendere in opere pubbliche (al settembre dello scorso anno), la strabiliante somma di 6,3 trilioni di dollari portando il rapporto debito/ pil del paese al 180% (il secondo al mondo dopo quello libanese se non ricordo male). L'effetto di questi interventi sull'economia del paese orientale fu limitato e non salvò il Giappone da quasi 15 anni di stagnazione economica. L'esperienza giapponese ha prodotto due scuole di pensiero: chi ritiene, come Geithner , che il Giappone non sia intervenuto in maniera sufficientemente massiccia e tempestiva, diluting public expenditure over a lengthy period and those who believe that this kind of involvement is simply useless.
The bottom part of NYT seems to be: "if you really need to intervene with public money, let's at least in those areas that can ensure a continuous level of development and employment in the near future."
In this sense, build cathedrals in the desert that appears questionable practical utility, and that once fully discharged any impact on the employment side, it would be a great strategy. The money should be invested in innovative sectors can create jobs and future development. Which brings us back to the old talk about what a state whose action is often based on political considerations, is able to correctly identify the areas in question.
Obama and the package of action drawn up by his administration do not even pretend to identify areas preferred. The money seems to be spread in the hope that rain would come magically to create a lasting and sustainable development. It is also an amount of money sufficient to satisfy the most ardent interventionists. Paul Krugman , always from the pages of the NYT , launches an urgent warning: the magnitude of the stimulus package would be too limited. According Krugman should be at least 50% higher in order to achieve any significant effect. The noted economist also accused the U.S. Senate have imposed unreasonable limits on aid granted to individual states in the name of a centrist logic, thus leaving open one of the most sensitive nerves of the U.S. economy.
All according Krugman would result in at least 600,000 more unemployed over the next two years.
That deficit of individual states is a really good tough nuts to crack, but I think Krugman on this side can calm down. Even if the U.S. government will not intervene now, it will be obliged to do so tomorrow. The alternative would be to accept the failure of an unknown number of states, a way not feasible politically.
Another character that would classify as interventionist Nuriel Roubini, lately seems to distance itself from the maneuvers of the American administration and recalling the Japanese example says
... And the U.S. could make some the same mistakes of Japan and suffer similar constraints in terms of macro policy can limit the ability to solve the financial crisis in a more rapid. First, monetary policy - as aggressive - is translated into a string when you push a block because of widespread default on the credit market, rather than a liquidity problem. Second, fiscal policy has its limits in a world where you are already the largest net debtor, the person who needs more net loans and that will need to borrow, net, $ 2 trillion (2.5 trillion Gross dollars) this year to finance its fiscal deficit while other countries (including your traditional creditors) in the same way, they are maintaining high levels of fiscal deficit at the risk of occurrence of a sudden increase interest rates in the long term, once the tsunami of new government bonds will hit the U.S. market (see for example the increase in redeeming good in the last 10 days and the appalling signal that it sent on a possible next location in the market for U.S. treasury bonds). Third, the U.S. is taking an approach to cleaning and recapitalization of the banking reminiscent Japan (preferential flow and delay of a real clean to prevent / delay to shareholders and unsecured creditors, a necessary suffering) rather than the Swedish working process Detection of total / nationalization. Fourth, the case approach was adopted to accommodate the demands of the market, the necessary reduction of the debt of insolvent non-financial ( corportate for Japan, owners homes for the U.S.) will be too slow because working on the debt of one owner at a time, the disposal of the debt of 15 million owners of insolvent take many years, while an excess of debt reduction would require a broad-spectrum (as in Mexico and Argentina) that is not politically acceptable - at this moment - in the USA.
Roubini puts it, acutely, the nail on the head. If you do not clearly resolve the problem of insolvency and banking of excess private debt, any other type of intervention in danger of being vain. Moreover, even if they wanted to bet on state investment, the 819 billion measures decided by the team of Obama because they are too few can obtain a significant result and are scattered in many streams throughout the entire spectrum of the economy. It is difficult to translate into steady growth and self development.
Those who hoped that the coming of Obama would represent a radical change had to change his mind. After establishing the composition of his economic team all hope has faded gradually. The block does not make decisions on matters economic - consisting Geithner, Rubin, Summers etc. - belongs to the tip of the hair to a estabilishment composed of bankers and lobbyists, while the few old-school counselors who could advance at Obama's policies more reasonable and less prone to the will of Wall Street as Paul Volcker were marginalized.
Tomorrow we will know who wants to Geithner, but as I expected in the past, it will be difficult for something really positive or decisive. Regarding economic issues I do not think that U.S. citizens can be said to be in good hands.
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